

PROVIDING EMPLOYMENT & INCOME SUPPORTS FOR NONCUSTODIAL PARENTS

Child Support Policy Fact Sheet

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Introduction

Employment-oriented programs offered as an alternative to traditional child support enforcement have the potential to improve outcomes for noncustodial fathers with a limited ability to pay child support.¹ Noncustodial fathers who are struggling to stay on their feet need more support, not only because of the child support that they pay, but also because of their value as parents, employees, and members of the community. Investments in stronger work skills, job advancement, and income supplements for both parents could lead to more financially secure families, better life outcomes for children and parents, more equitable policies, and less strain on public systems.

This fact sheet is part of the [Centering Child Well-Being in Child Support Policy](#) series produced by [Ascend at the Aspen Institute](#) and [Good+Foundation](#) to highlight family-centered child support policies. This fact sheet provides an overview of the evidence for effective state and local child support-led employment programs and state policies to expand state Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) for noncustodial parents.

What the Research Shows

Employment-oriented programs offered as an alternative to traditional child support enforcement have the potential to improve outcomes for noncustodial fathers with a limited ability to pay child support. Although there is no “magic bullet,” there is promising evidence that employment services combined with responsive child support services, case management, and other supportive services² can improve the employment,³ earnings,⁴ child support compliance⁵ and payments⁶ of noncustodial parents who are unemployed or have low earnings and owe child support. These programs also can result in substantial improvements in noncustodial fathers' attitudes toward the child support program,⁷ an increased sense of parental responsibility toward their children,⁸ and increased father-child contact.⁹

In addition, earning supplements that mirrored Earned Income Tax Credits (EITC) reduced severe poverty and increased the employment, earnings, and child support payments for a subgroup of employed noncustodial parents who earn low wages.¹⁰ A research project in New York City called *Paycheck Plus* tested earnings supplements for noncustodial parents and other workers without children in the home that were designed to complement the federal EITC to provide a combined “childless worker” credit of up to \$2,000.¹¹ An evaluation of the Noncustodial Parent New York State Earned Income Credit found that employment and child support compliance increased among noncustodial parents with lower orders.¹²

What Isn't Working

Most noncustodial fathers who fail to make regular child support payments do not have full-time employment or sufficient wages to comply with their child support orders.¹³ According to the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), 13 percent of noncustodial parents are unemployed for extended lengths of time.¹⁴ Fathers with low incomes face systemic and interrelated barriers to employment that limit their opportunities in the job market – limited education, literacy, job skills and work history; a criminal record; child support and other debts; housing, food, transportation and child care needs; competing family responsibilities; physical and mental health challenges; and racial discrimination.¹⁵ Jobs open to fathers facing employment barriers are likely to be low-wage, part-time, temporary, and far from home.¹⁶

For noncustodial fathers who struggle in the job market, standard child support enforcement actions can backfire. For example, driver's license suspension or jail can make it even harder for noncustodial fathers to work and may push them into the underground economy, making it less likely that families will receive consistent child support payments.¹⁷

Why It Matters to Families

Consistent child support payments can reduce intergenerational poverty and its negative effects on children, which are central goals of two-generation (2Gen) programs. Child support income can substantially increase the incomes of custodial mothers experiencing deep poverty, more than doubling their earnings.¹⁸ Children who are financially supported by their noncustodial fathers have better cognitive development and are at lower risk of maltreatment.¹⁹ However, noncustodial fathers with low earnings cannot pay significant amounts of child support unless their employment levels and earnings also increase.²⁰

Some noncustodial fathers feel trapped by [child support debt](#) and other financial and parenting responsibilities and do not see any way out.²¹ For example, they may have competing legal financial obligations arising out of the criminal justice system that disproportionately entangle Black fathers in low-income communities and come with their own threat of incarceration if not paid (e.g. fines, court costs, booking charges, drug testing fees, jail fees, probation and parole fees, public defender recoupment, restitution, driver's license reinstatement fees).²² Fathers also may have unpaid medical bills, student loans, or other debts.²³ They may have more than one family to support and may provide childcare or have other family caregiving responsibilities.²⁴

Custodial mothers sometimes forego formal child support services to avoid the destabilizing repercussions of child support enforcement when noncustodial fathers lack stable jobs and steady wages. Nearly 40 percent of custodial

parents without child support orders reported to the Census Bureau that they did not have one because the other parent provides what he or she can, while 30 percent reported that the other parent cannot afford to pay.²⁵

Why It Matters to States

Child support compliance is strongly linked to stable employment and regular earnings.²⁶ The primary mechanism for collecting on-time child support payments is automatic payroll withholding. When noncustodial fathers are unemployed or underemployed, child support agencies have difficulty collecting child support, and unpaid child support often accrues. Arrears are largely uncollectible when the main reason for nonpayment of the obligation is low or no earnings.²⁷ When debt-driven enforcement actions are poorly targeted, they can be cost-ineffective and do more harm than good, resulting in sporadic collections, reduced parental employment, wasted judicial and administrative effort, and additional state and societal costs.²⁸

States have a long-term interest in helping build the capacity of noncustodial fathers to work and earn that goes beyond child support compliance. Low-wage workers have been hit particularly hard by the COVID-19 pandemic. But employment opportunities for men with limited education, job skills, and work history have been declining for decades. The decline in real wages has been especially large for men with a high school education or less, with inflation-adjusted wages lower in 2018 than they were in 1973.²⁹ Structural labor market changes, combined with incarceration and child support enforcement policies, have had a measurable and profound impact on the employment prospects of Black men with less education for two generations.³⁰

Noncustodial fathers who are struggling to stay on their feet need more support, not only because of the child support that they pay, but also because of their value as parents, employees, and members of the community. Investments in stronger work skills and job advancement for both parents could lead to more financially secure families, better life outcomes for children and parents, more equitable policies, and less strain on public systems.

A Better Way to Do Business

States and counties can implement two strategies to increase the workforce participation, child support payments, and financial stability of noncustodial fathers with low or no earnings: (1) employment-oriented services and (2) income supplements. These strategies take a 2Gen approach to address the needs of noncustodial fathers, as employment-oriented services and supports can contribute to the well-being of both parents and their children together.³¹

1. Employment-oriented services

States can recognize and reinforce the financial responsibilities that noncustodial fathers have toward their children by refocusing public resources to strengthen the capacity of fathers to pay.³² Employment-oriented services aim to address the root cause of nonpayment in most cases — low or nonexistent earnings.³³ While noncustodial fathers with low earnings have diverse employment histories and service needs, there is some evidence that employment-oriented programs may make the biggest difference for noncustodial fathers with no recent work history.³⁴

Employment programs can improve the economic circumstances of noncustodial fathers, even when employment and earnings increases are limited. For example, Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED) participants were less likely to experience housing instability, more likely to have a bank account, and more likely to receive Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and Medicaid. Just as importantly, employment-oriented programs can offer fatherhood, parenting, and other services that support noncustodial fathers in their role as parents.³⁵

Nearly two-thirds of states (31 states and the District of Columbia) have established at least one statewide or local child support employment-oriented program for noncustodial parents having difficulty paying their child support orders.³⁶ Federal law requires state courts or the child support agency to implement “pay or work” procedures providing for payment plans or participation in work activities when noncustodial parents with children receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) owe child support arrears.³⁷ Employment-oriented programs can be funded through the Workforce Innovation and Opportunities Act of 2014, the TANF program, or other sources.³⁸ Although child support matching funds may not be used to fund employment services without a federal waiver, they may be used for case management, data collection, coordination with program partners, and related activities that help pull together program services.³⁹ In addition, states may use performance incentive funds with federal approval.⁴⁰

The labor market context, program design, service mix, recruitment strategies, funding sources, and participant characteristics of employment-oriented programs vary, and there is not yet clear evidence that one approach is more effective than others.⁴¹ Some states offer employment-oriented services on a voluntary basis as an early intervention approach to prevent the build-up of arrears. Other states mandate participation in court-based or agency programs as a “back-end” alternative to incarceration in civil contempt cases after a noncustodial father has accumulated significant arrears or provide for a mix of voluntary and mandatory participation.⁴²

Regardless of the approach used, research suggests the importance of child support agencies as a key partner. Child support agencies have demonstrated that they can effectively partner with other service providers to provide employment services, overcome recruitment challenges, and gain the trust of participants.⁴³ Child support offers a unique platform for employment-oriented services for noncustodial parents,

because child support agencies can reach the noncustodial parents in their caseloads, have a direct stake in improving employment and earnings outcomes, and can identify and remove child support barriers to employment.⁴⁴

While it may seem counterintuitive, child support agencies have been able to overcome the issue of parental distrust by setting the conditions for child support caseworkers to create empathetic, meaningful, and even transformative relationships with noncustodial fathers.⁴⁵ By developing relationships with fathers and mothers, child support caseworkers have become more family-centered, responsive, and aware of the circumstances of the parents they serve, reorienting the program culture from enforcement to family-centered support.⁴⁶

Even with employment-oriented services, however, some noncustodial fathers may not be able to obtain employment that pays enough to support themselves and their children. It is difficult to substantially improve the earnings of noncustodial fathers with limited education and work histories without also building their occupational skills and job advancement opportunities.⁴⁷ Yet there is limited evidence to date about strategies that allow them to advance to better-paying jobs.⁴⁸

2. Income Supplements

States can combine employment-oriented services with income supplements and supports to encourage and reward work and boost the incomes of noncustodial fathers.⁴⁹ More than half of states (29 states and the District of Columbia) have established state EITC programs to supplement the federal credit, using TANF or other funds.⁵⁰ Five states — California Maine, Maryland, Minnesota and the District of Columbia — have expanded their EITC for workers with no children in the home, including noncustodial parents.⁵¹ In addition, New York and Washington D.C. have implemented a state EITC specifically for noncustodial parents.⁵² State child support agencies also can identify and refer noncustodial fathers to available income support programs, health care programs, and other supportive services as part of their standard case management practices.

Endnotes

¹ Both fathers and mothers living apart from their children are legally responsible for paying child support, and the incomes of both parents are taken into account in setting support orders. Although the focus of this fact sheet is on noncustodial fathers, gender-neutral terms are used to accurately describe specific research findings and state practices. This fact sheet was authored by Vicki Turetsky, Esq., former federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) commissioner.

² Most of the research demonstration projects cited in this fact sheet are multi-faceted interventions that have employment as a core component, but also include other components such as fatherhood and parenting services, that may have an impact. For links to evaluation reports, briefs, policies, planning guides, webinars, and other resources, see Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), *Knowledge Works! Resources for Child Support-Led Employment Services*, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

³ Employment increased in *Parents' Fair Share*, a large multistate demonstration, for the subgroup of noncustodial parents with the most severe employment barriers and least able to get a job on their own, Cynthia Miller and Virginia Knox, *The Challenge of Helping Low-Income Father Support Their Children: Final Lessons from Parents' Fair Share*, MDRC, 2001 (experimental design); a New York program, Kye Lippold and Elaine Sorensen, *Strengthening Families Through Stronger Fathers Initiative: Summary of Impact Findings*, Urban Institute, 2012 (non-experimental design); a Tennessee program, Lanae Davis, Jessica Pearson, and Nancy Thoennes, *Evaluation of the Tennessee Parent Support Program*, Center for Policy Research, 2013 (non-experimental design); and a Texas program, Daniel Schroeder and Nicholas Doughty, *Texas Non-Custodial Parent Choices: Program Impact Analysis*, Ray Marshal Center, University of Texas-Austin, 2009 (non-experimental design). In addition, some subsidized and transitional jobs programs increased noncustodial parent employment, at least in the short term. Dan Bloom, *Can Subsidized Employment Programs Help Disadvantaged Job Seekers?* MDRC, 2020 (experimental design). See Sarah Avellar, Reginald Covington, Quinn Moore, Ankita Patnaik, and April Wu, *Parents and Children Together: Effects of Four Responsible Fatherhood Programs for Low-Income Fathers*, Mathematica Policy Research, 2018 (Responsible fatherhood programs with employment component improved employment stability).

⁴ Earnings increased in *the Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED)*, a large multistate demonstration, Maria Cancian, Daniel R Meyer, and Robert G. Wood, *Final Impact Findings from the Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED)*, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2019 (experimental design); an Arapahoe County, Colorado program, Jessica Pearson, Lanae Davis and Jane Venohr, *Parents to Work! Program Outcomes and Economic Impacts*, Center for Policy Research, 2011 (experimental design); for a subgroup of noncustodial parents participating in *Parents' Fair Share* with the most severe employment barriers; for a subgroup of court-ordered participants in a Maryland program, Catherine E. Born, Pamela Caudill Ovwigho, and Correne Saunders, *The Noncustodial Parent Employment Program: Employment and Payment Outcomes*, School of Social Work, University of Maryland, 2011 (non-experimental design); and the New York *Strengthening Families Through Stronger Fathers Initiative*. In addition, some subsidized and transitional jobs programs substantially increased noncustodial parent earnings, at least in the short term, Bloom, 2020. However, earnings were lower in the Texas *NPC Choices* program.

⁵ Child support compliance increased in *Families Forward Demonstration*, a multistate demonstration testing occupational skill-building to help noncustodial parents qualify for higher-paying jobs, Kyla Wasserman, Lily Freedman, Zaina Rodney, and Caroline Schultz, *Connecting Parents to Occupational Training: A Partnership Between Child Support Agencies and Local Service Providers*, MDRC, April 2021 (non-experimental design); *Parents Fair Share*; the *Maryland Noncustodial Parent Employment Program*; the *Tennessee Parent Support Program*; and the *Texas NPC Choices* program.

⁶ Child support payment amounts increased in the *Families Forward Demonstration*; *Parents' Fair Share*; the New York *Strengthening Families through Stronger Fathers* program; the *Texas NCP Choices* program; the Colorado *Parents to Work!*; and the *Maryland Noncustodial Parent Employment Program*. In addition, subsidized and transitional jobs programs increased child support payments, at least in the short term, even when there were few employment and earnings impacts. Bloom, 2020. A goal of *CSPED* was to right-

size child support orders. Current support orders were reduced by \$15 to \$16 per month, leading to a small reduction in current child support payments of about \$4 to \$5.

⁷ Improved attitudes toward the child support program increased in the *Families Forward Demonstration* and *CSPED*.

⁸ Parental sense of responsibility increased in *CSPED*.

⁹ Parental involvement increased and harsh discipline decreased in *CSPED*, while parental involvement also increased for a subgroup of noncustodial parents participating in *Parents' Fair Share* who had been the least likely to see their children. See Avellar, *et al.*, 2018 (Responsible fatherhood programs with employment component improved parenting and nurturing behaviors, but did not affect parental contact or financial support).

¹⁰ *Paycheck Plus*, a demonstration program in New York City and Atlanta provided supplemental payments similar to the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to noncustodial parents and other workers who do not live with their children (experimental design). Cynthia Miller, Lawrence F. Katz, Gilda Azurdia, Adam Isen, Caroline Schulz, and Kali Aloisi, *Boosting the Earned Income Tax Credit for Singles: Final Impact Findings from the Paycheck Plus Demonstration in New York City*, MDRC, 2018; Cynthia Miller, Lawrence F. Katz, Edith Yang, Alexandra Bernardi, Adam Isen, and Kali Aloisi, *A More Generous Earned Income Tax Credit for Singles: Interim Findings from the Paycheck Plus Demonstration in Atlanta*, MDRC, 2020. Although the final report from the Atlanta site has not yet been published, implementation was more challenging and early findings were less positive. See Cynthia Miller and Lawrence F. Katz, "Biden Wants to Boost the EITC for Workers Without Dependent Children—What Does the Research Say?" *The Hill*, Feb. 2021. When noncustodial parents owe child support, EITC payments are normally subject to federal tax offset, 42 U.S.C. § 664. However, the Atlanta project site had a federal waiver to exempt the payments from tax offset.

¹¹ The EITC, one of the most successful federal anti-poverty programs, supplements the earnings of families with children and "childless workers." The EITC is a federal refundable tax credit that in 2021 provided up to \$5,980 for head of households living with two children. Noncustodial parents are considered to be "childless workers" under the federal program, even though they are jointly responsible for supporting their children. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, P.L. 117-2, temporarily expanded the childless worker maximum credit to \$1,502, nearly tripling the \$543 maximum benefit for childless workers in 2021, and increased the Child Tax Credit to \$3,600 per child for families with children in the home. Margot L. Crandall-Hollick, *The Childless EITC: Temporary Expansion for 2021 Under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021*, Congressional Research Service, updated May 3, 2021; Internal Revenue Service, *Earned Income and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) Tables* (undated).

¹² Austin Nichols, Elaine Sorensen, and Kye Lippold, *The New York Noncustodial Parent EITC: Its Impact on Child Support Payments and Employment*, Urban Institute, 2012.

¹³ Letitia Logan Passarella, *Maryland's Child Support Caseload: Examining Obligor Who Owed Support in 2017*, School of Social Work, University of Maryland 2018; Yoonsock Ha, Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, and Eunhee Han, *Factors Associated with Nonpayment of Child Support*, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008.

¹⁴ OCSE-IM-18-02 (Feb. 15, 2018).

¹⁵ Lisa Klein Vogel, *Challenges and Opportunities for Engaging Noncustodial Parents in Employment and Other Services*, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, rev. 2019; Ronald B. Mincy and Hyunjoon Um, *Growth and Change in the Composition of Vulnerable Nonresident Fatherhood*, Columbia University, 2018; Maria Cancian, Angela Guarin, Leslie Hodges, and Daniel R. Meyer, *Characteristics of Participants in the Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED) Evaluation*, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2018; Pamela

Holcomb, Kathryn Edin, Jeffrey Max, Alford Young, Jr., Angela Valdovinos D'Angelo, Daniel Friend, Elizabeth Clary, and Waldo E. Johnson, Jr., *In Their Own Voices: The Hopes and Struggles of Responsible Fatherhood Program Participants in the Parent and Children Together Evaluation*, Office of Planning, Research, and Evaluation, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2015; Devah Pager, Bruce Western, and Bert Bonikowski, "Discrimination in a Low-Income Wage Market: A Field Experiment," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 74, 777, 2009.

¹⁶ Holcomb *et al.*, 2015.

¹⁷ Maria Cancian, Carilyn J. Heinrich, and Yiyoon Chung, "Discouraging Fathers' Employment: An Unintended Consequence of Policies Designed to Support Families," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 32, issue 4, 758, 2013; Daniel P. Miller and Ronald B. Mincy, "Falling Further Behind? Child Support Arrears and Fathers' Labor Force Participation," *Social Service Review*, vol. 86, no. 4, 604, 2012; The Pew Charitable Trusts, *Collateral Costs: Incarceration's Effect on Economic Mobility*, 2010; *Incarceration, Employment, and Earnings Among Fathers in Fragile Families*, Fragile Families Research Brief, no. 38, Bendheim-Thoman Center for Research on Child Wellbeing, Princeton University and Social Indicators Survey Center, Columbia University, 2007.

¹⁸ Deep poverty is defined as income that is 50 percent or less of the federal poverty level. Natalie Demyan and Letitia Logan Passarella, *Lifting Families Out of Poverty: Child Support Is an Effective Tool for Maryland Families*, Social of Social Work, University of Maryland, 2019. See Elaine Sorensen, *The Child Support Program is a Good Investment*, Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016.

¹⁹ Avellar, *et al.*, 2018.

²⁰ Leslie Hodges, Daniel R. Meyer, and Maria Cancian, "What Happens When the Amount of the Child Support Due Is a Burden? Revisiting the Relationship Between Child Support Orders and Child Support Payments," *Social Service Review*, vol. 94, 2020.

²¹ Holcomb *et al.*, 2015.

²² Mary Pattillo and Gabriela Kirk, "Pay Unto Caesar: Breaches of Justice in the Monetary Sanctions Regime," *UCLA Criminal Justice Law Review*, vol. IV, 117, 2020.

Vicki Turetsky and Maureen R. Waller, "Piling on Debt: The Intersections Between Child Support Arrears and Legal Financial Obligations," *UCLA Criminal Justice Law Review*, vol. IV, 117, 2020; Lavanya Madhusudan, *The Criminalization of Poverty: How to Break the Cycle through Policy Reform in Maryland*, Jobs Opportunities Task Force, 2018.

²³ Wasserman, *et al.*, 2021.

²⁴ Wasserman, *et al.*, 2021; Vogel, 2019. In the CSPED demonstration, one-third of participants had children living at home as well as living apart.

²⁵ Timothy Grail, *Custodial Mothers and Fathers and Their Child Support: 2017*, Current Populations Reports, P60-269, Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2020.

²⁶ Lauren A. Hall, Letitia Logan Passarella and Catherine E. Born, *Who Pays Child Support? Noncustodial Parents' Payment Compliance*, School of Social, Work University of Maryland, 2014; Letitia Logan Passarella and Catherine E. Born, *Who Pays Child Support in Baltimore City? Noncustodial Parent (NPC) Payment Compliance*, School of Social Work, University of Maryland, 2014 (In Maryland, noncustodial fathers who paid all of their support due every month earned an average of \$44,000, while fathers who did not pay any support earned \$7,350); Judi Bartfeld and Daniel Meyer, "Child Support Compliance Among Discretionary and Nondiscretionary Obligor," *Social Services Review*, vol. 77, no. 3, 347, 2003.

²⁷ Elaine Sorensen, Liliana Sousa, and Simon Schaner, *Assessing Child Support Arrears in Nine Large States and the Nation*, Urban Institute, 2007.

²⁸ Vogel, Schroeder and Doughty, 2009.

²⁹ Miller *et al.*, 2020.

³⁰ Harry J. Holzer, Paul Offner, and Elaine Sorensen, “Declining Employment Among Young Black Less-Educated Men: The Role of Incarceration and Child Support,” *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 24, 2005.

³¹ *Overview of Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration Evaluation*, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, (undated); Moore, *et al.*, 2019.

³² To provide one example, the cost per participant in CSPED averaged \$2,647, partially offset by a reduction in costs related to child support enforcement activities and other savings. Quinn Moore, Katherine Anne Magnuson, April Yanyuan Wu, *Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED): Findings from the Benefit-Cost Analysis*, Institute for Research on Policy, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2019.

³³ Schroeder and Doughty, 2009.

³⁴ Born, Ovwigho, and Saunders, 2011 (especially among unemployed noncustodial parents who participated voluntarily); Miller and Knox, 2001.

³⁵ Cancian, *et al.*, 2019.

³⁶ OCSE, *Knowledge Works! Child Support-Led Employment Programs by State*, May 25, 2021.

³⁷ 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(15).

³⁸ OCSE, *Knowledge Works! Partnering with Workforce Programs to Provide Noncustodial Parents with Employment Services*, Sept. 15, 2021 (webinar); OCSE, *Knowledge Works! Partnering with TANF for Employment Services for Noncustodial Parents*, Nov. 19, 2019 (webinar).

³⁹ 45 C.F.R. § 304.20; OCSE-IM-20-03, *Section 1115 Waivers* (April 2, 2020); OCSE-PIQ-12-02, *Partnering with other programs, including outreach, referral, and case management activities* (Dec. 7, 2012); TANF-ACF-IM-2018-01, *The use of TANF funds to promote employment programs for noncustodial parents* (Feb. 14, 2018). A 2016 set of rules promulgated by the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) originally proposed language to fund a limited set of employment services. Although commenters overwhelmingly supported this provision, key Members of Congress did not, and the provision was withdrawn. 81 *Fed. Reg.* 93492, 93531 (Dec. 20, 2016); 79 *Fed. Reg.* 68548, 68556-68557, 68568-68569 (Nov. 17, 2014).

⁴⁰ 42 U.S.C. § 658a(f); OCSE-AT-20-01, *Reinvesting Child Support Incentive Payments* (Jan. 31, 2020); OCSE-IM-18-02, *Use of IV-D Incentive Funds for NCP Work Activities* (Feb. 15, 2018); OCSE, *Knowledge Works! Reinvesting Incentive Payments and Section 1115 Waivers for Employment Services for Noncustodial Parents*, Mar. 2, 2020 (webinar).

⁴¹ Patrick A. Landers, *Child Support Enforcement-Led Employment Services for Noncustodial Parents: In Brief*, Congressional Research Service, R46365, 2020.

⁴² OCSE, *Knowledge Works! Partnering with Courts to Enroll Noncustodial Parents into Employment Services*, Apr. 19, 2020 (webinar); OCSE, *Knowledge Works! Existing Program Models* (undated).

⁴³ Wasserman, *et al.*, 2021: Elaine Sorensen, *What We Learned from Recent Federal Evaluations of Programs Servicing Disadvantaged Noncustodial Parents*, Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation, Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2020; *Overview of Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration Evaluation*, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison (undated); Miller and Knox, 2001. Although recruitment is a persistent issue in increasing voluntary participation in all employment programs (not just those offered to noncustodial parents), child support agencies have shown that they can successfully recruit noncustodial fathers.

⁴⁴ Landers, 2020; Miller and Knox, 2001.

⁴⁵ *Reaching Their Full Potential: Strategies for Supporting Young Fathers of Color*, Center for Urban Families, 2020.

⁴⁶ Reggie Bicha and Roxane White, *Engaging Fathers in Child Support: From a Punitive to a Supportive Approach*, Solution series, Ascend, Aspen Institute, 2018; Jennifer Noyes, Lisa Klein Vogel, and Lanikque Howard, *Final Evaluation Findings from the Child Support Noncustodial Parent Employment Demonstration (CSPED) Evaluation*, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2018.

⁴⁷ AEI/Brookings Working Group on Poverty and Opportunity, *Opportunity, Responsibility, and Security*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy and the Brookings Institution, 2014.

⁴⁸ Wasserman, *et al.*, 2021; Betsy L. Tessler, Michael Bangset, Alexandra Pennington, Kelsey Schaberg, and Hannah Dalporto, *Meeting the Needs of Workers and Employers: Implementation of a Sector-Focused Career Advancement Model for Low-Skilled Adults*, MDRC, 2014.

⁴⁹ Wasserman, *et al.*, 2021. Researchers found that providing individuals with information about employment services may increase the employment effects of *Paycheck Plus*.

⁵⁰ Erica Williams, Samantha Waxman and Julian Legendre, *States Can Adopt or Expand Earned Income Tax Credits to Build a Stronger Future Economy*, Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, updated 2020; Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, *Policy Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit*, updated 2018.

⁵¹ Richard Williams, *State, Federal Governments Getting Behind Earned Income Tax Credits*, National Conference of State Legislatures, 2020; Richard Williams, *Expanding Earned Income Tax Credit for Childless Workers*, National Conference of State Legislatures, 2019.

⁵² Nichols, *et al.*, 2012; Laura Wheaton and Elaine Sorensen, "Extending the EITC to Noncustodial Parents: Potential Impacts and Design Considerations," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management*, vol. 29, no. 4, 749, 2010.